In “Incompleness - The proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel” by Rebecca Goldstein He was adamant on the impossibility of being able to speak about a formal language in the way that Gödel’s proof does.” Gödel’s proof, the very possibility of a proof of its kind, is forbidden on the grounds of Wittgensteinian tenets that remained constant through the transformation from ‘early’ to ‘later’ Wittgenstein, where early Wittgenstein had a monolithic view of language and its rules and later Wittgenstein fractured language into self-contained language-games, each functioning according to its own set of rules. “It is really not so surprising that Wittgenstein would dismiss Gödel’s result with a belittling description like ‘logische Kunstücke,’ logical conjuring tricks, patently devoid of the large metamathematical import that Gödel and other mathematicians presumed his theorems had.
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